Increasing numbers won't restore peace
OMAHA WORLD-HERALD

President Bush soon will decide whether to increase the size of the U.S. military.

A convincing case can be made for such a step.

He also will decide whether to boost the size of the U.S. forces in Iraq. The case for that move, however, is weak.

Whatever the president and the pursestring controlling Congress decide, the United States one way or another is about to face a reckoning along three dimensions:

! Strategic - After dithering for years after 9/11, the United States finally will resolve the question of whether to expand overall troop numbers, particularly ground forces, in a significant way.

! Geopolitical - A key decision involving Iraq will be settled, with either a "surge" of additional U.S. troops or a gradual reduction in forces.

! Budgetary - Any significant boost in service-personnel numbers would involve major costs (about $1.2 billion for every 10,000 additional Army soldiers, according to Gen. Peter J. Schoomaker, the Army's chief of staff). Despite the difficulties, finding those funds would be the right thing to do.

The heavy toll on equipment and personnel (including the National Guard and Reserve units) from the conflicts in Iraq and Afghanistan has long been evident.

The Army and Marines alone are wearing out nearly $20 billion of equipment a year in those two countries. The military clearly needs more troops in order to rotate forces in and out of that region without excessive strain.

In his impassioned statements during a recent congressional hearing, Schoomaker was convincing in arguing that unless relief is provided, the activeduty Army "will break" in trying to maintain the current high-tempo operations.

Schoomaker called for adding at least 7,000 troops to the Army, and considerably larger numbers (up to 30,000 for the Army and 5,000 for the Marines) have seriously been mentioned by others in the armed forces.

Although training and equipping additional personnel will take considerable time, an increase in troop strength could go far in lessening the strain.

At this early stage, it would be presumptuous to peg any single number as the magic one for Congress to fund.

The complex details of budget considerations and military logistics need to be analyzed and the proper negotiations completed.

The bottom line, however, is clear: The military needs relief.

In contrast, the call for a "surge" of increased forces for Iraq rests on dubious thinking.

The Bush administration has been adamantly rejecting calls for more troops ever since the spring of 2003, and it is quite late in the game for the president to reverse course on that question.

Americans by now have abundant experience with the depth of Iraqi depravity shaping events in that benighted country.

And the idea that increased U.S. numbers alone somehow can restore order to Baghdad and curtail Sunni brutalities in western Iraq ought to be seen for what it is: a pipe dream.

U.S. forces in Iraq rightly express the desire to do right by the Iraqis. But at the same time, Pentagon generals have understandably made no secret of their skepticism regarding the "surge" proposal.

U.S. Rep. Ike Skelton, D-Mo., the incoming chairman of the House Armed Services Committee, expressed justified disdain last week in his response to a query about whether an influx of additional U.S. personnel is appropriate in Iraq. "The time for a troop increase," he said, "was about 3 1/2 years ago, when we initially went into Iraq."

Americans can argue about whether any level of U.S. forces could have led to victory within the past three years.

But there ought to be no question that adding a "surge" of thousands of new troops at this late date would be of little use, given the magnitude and complexity of Iraq's problems.